| Sustainable Livelihoods and New Institutional
Economics |
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Glossary |
Asset specificity is where a productive asset is
largely limited to one specific use. Where investments in such assets are
non-trivial, considerable effort will be made to arrange transactions that will
provide continuity in the use of the asset. Without continuity it may not be
possible to achieve a positive return on the investment. Fishing technology,
for example, requires significant investments, and once these have been made
these assets cannot easily be transferred to other uses. The owners of such
technology will therefore seek contracts that will guarantee them access to a
level of fisheries resources that will at least enable them to cover their
investment costs. The negotiation and enforcement of such contracts raises the
level of transaction costs. Many investments aimed at
improved natural management involve expenditure on assets that cannot easily be
transferred to other uses. Examples include water conservation technologies,
such as canal lining, reservoirs, irrigation control gates, and drainage; soil
conservation technologies, such as terracing and walls; some of the investment
in human capital and environmental management skills. Appropriate institutional
mechanisms are required in order to ensure an adequate return on
such assets. Without such institutions the returns will not warrant
the initial investment and investment incentives will be minimal.
Asymmetric information occurs where access to
information by one party (or parties) to a transaction is better than access by
another party. Asymmetric information can be used as a source of power in
determining the outcome of the transaction. . A common example is where the
seller of a good knows much more about the characteristics of that good than
the buyer (see also Imperfect Information)
Bounded rationality is the condition in which decision
making is motivated by the desire to maximise economic benefits, whilst being
limited by imperfect information. It is a condition in which individuals are
intendedly rational, but are subject to limited cognitive competence as a
result of imperfect information.
Common pool resources (CPR) are characterised by the
difficulty of excluding actors from using them and the fact that the use by one
individual or group means that less is available for use by others. (The latter
point distinguishes CPR from pure public goods which exhibit both non
excludability and non rivalry in consumption). CPRs include some fisheries,
irrigation systems and grazing areas.
Common Property Rights Regime refers to a particular
definition of property rights over a resource or asset where ownership is by an
identified group, rather than an individual. Such regimes are often the most
appropriate for ensuring optimal use of Common Pool
resources.
Externalities exist where the activities of those
actors party to a transaction affect (either positively or negatively) a third
party and no account is made of that effect in terms of payment or
compensation. Externalities are an example of market failure due to a weak
definition of property rights over an asset.
Fixed costs (of transaction) refer to any costs that
do not vary in proportion with the scale of an economic activity and are thus
higher per unit transacted for smaller scales of activity.
Imperfect information. In a world in which information
is imperfect, the cost of obtaining information is positive, and where
resources are scarce, the measurement, monitoring and enforcement of contracts
are unlikely to be perfect. So long as information is not perfect, economic
agents engaged in transactions will have to submit to a certain amount of
uncertainty. Uncertainty can be reduced by devoting more time and resources to
measuring, monitoring and enforcement, and, in general, the greater the
perceived uncertainty, the more resources will have to be devoted to these
activities if transactions are to take place. Where these activities are unable
to reduce uncertainty sufficiently, or where the cost of doing so is too high,
new, innovative institutions for and ways of conducting measurement, monitoring
and enforcement and reducing their associated transaction costs will have to be
found. Otherwise transactions will not occur.
Institutions are defined as the formal or informal
rules governing peoples and organisations behaviour. Institutions,
the rules of the game, are distinguished from organisations which,
along with individuals, are considered as players in the game.
Formal institutions (such as by-laws, national laws, policies, the
national constitution, and international laws and treaties) are part of the
institutional environment and distinct from institutional arrangements. For
informal institutions (such as social customs and conventions), the
distinction may not always be so clear. However, widespread acceptance of
particular institutional arrangements as the norm can mean that in effect they
become part of the institutional environment.
Institutional arrangements are defined as the forms of
contract or arrangement that are set up for particular transactions or holding
of assets.
Institutional environment is defined as the broader
set of institutions (or rules of the game) within which people and
organisations develop and implement specific institutional
arrangements
Non-market transaction refers to an exchange of rights
over the ownership and/or use of an asset or good that does not involve a
market exchange.
Opportunism is a condition of self-interest
seeking with guile which is permitted by asymmetric
information whereby one party to a contract has information that the
other party does not. It too arises as a consequence of imperfect information.
Opportunistic behaviour, occurs where one party to a contract takes
advantage of his superior knowledge, in order to further his interests, by
failing to disclose such information to the other contracting party. This would
occur, for example, if a supplier of pesticide had information about a product
which was deliberately withheld from the potential buyer, in the knowledge that
such information would negatively affect the price of the product or the
willingness of the buyer to purchase it. This type of opportunistic behaviour
causes what is known in the NIE literature as adverse selection, and
generally takes place ex-ante the contract as a result of imperfect
measurement. Opportunism can also occur ex-post, when one party, the
principal, to the contract is unable to monitor and enforce the performance
in meeting contracted obligations of the other party, the agent. This is
sometimes known as moral hazard or the principal-agent problem,
and reduces the incentive for agents to fulfil their contractual obligations,
thereby leading to shirking or free riding
Path dependence refers to the institutions at one
place in time being determined by their evolution from earlier institutions. It
is defined by North as "a term used to account for the parallel
characteristic of an institutional framework that has shaped downstream
institutional choices and in consequence makes it difficult to alter the
direction of an economy once it is on a particular institutional path. The
reason is that the organizations of an economy and the interest groups they
produce are a consequence of the opportunity set provided by the existing
institutional framework. The resulting complementarities, economies of scope
and network externalities reflect the symbiotic interdependence among the
existing rules, the complementary informal constraints, and the interests of
members of organizations created as a consequence of the institutional
framework. In effect, an institutional matrix creates organizations and
interest groups whose welfare depends on that institutional framework".
Definition taken from North, D (1997) The Contribution of the New Institutional
Economics to an Understanding of the Transition Problem. 1997 UNU/WIDER Annual
Lecture
Full text of the Lecture
Property rights are the legally defined and
enforceable rights which relate to ownership and use of resources. (See article
in Bibliography for further detail)
Risk aversion describes a situation where actors are
either unwilling to engage in a transaction for fear that it will fail, leaving
them with some form of financial loss, or adopt institutional arrangements with high transaction
costs to reduce the probability of such a loss, even though the extra costs
incurred in avoiding the loss are greater than the average benefits expected
from avoiding the loss.
Transaction refers to the activities that
allow/constrain transformation activities. A transaction occurs when two or
more parties enter into a contract in which rights and obligations are
exchanged. Transactions range from those where all the rights and obligations
under the contract take place at a single instant in time, with no rights or
obligations remaining outstanding after the instant in time has passed (this is
the purest form of spot market transaction) to those which involve a
continuous exchange in which reciprocal rights and obligations are part of a
permanent contractual arrangement, with no specific termination point
- such as in the case of the long-term relationship
between landlords and tenants, between plantation owners and their permanent
employees, or between a fisheries management authority and individual
fishermen. Transactions also include those activities required to define,
implement and enforce a given set of property rights over an asset.
Transaction costs are the costs associated with the
transactions that are necessary for transformation activity to occur.
These costs can be usefully divided into ex-ante costs and
ex-post costs. Ex-ante costs involve the costs associated with
gathering information about an asset or the good or service derived from its
use, and about the other parties involved and the negotiating of and devising a
contract or set of rights in such a way as to maximise the likelihood of the
contracting partners meeting their obligations under the contract. Measurement
costs are an important part of the ex-ante cost of a transaction. These are the
costs involved in gathering information about the attribute of a commodity or
service that is to be the object of a contract and about the reliability and
trustworthiness of other parties to the contract. A fisheries management
authority needs to obtain information about the state of the natural resource
base, as well as about fishermen, before it enters into a contract with
fishermen entailing the allocation of fishing rights and the provision of
management services in exchange for the undertaking by fishermen to abide by
certain rules and regulations. Without such information the objectives of
fisheries management are unlikely to be realised. Ex-post costs are
those associated with monitoring the performance of any contract or set of
property rights associated with the use or exchange, to ensure that the
contracting partner is meeting his/her obligations that are incurred once a
contract has been negotiated and agreed, and where a transaction is extended
over time, and enforcing contracts where the contracting partner fails to meet
the obligations stipulated in the agreement. Enforcement costs are incurred
when a party to a contract strays from the obligations laid down in the
agreement, and are associated with measures taken by the aggrieved party to
rectify matters. The exclusion of parties from using resources where ownership
is defined to others is another example of an ex-post cost.
Transformation in the context of NIE refers to the
physical process by which inputs are converted into outputs. For example, a
production technology utilises labour, in combination with other resources, to
produce rice.
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